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4.

Moral reasoning in economics*
Jonathan B. Wight

The Teagle discussion analyzes why economics teachers have become
overly narrow in their pedagogical perspectives, thus pulling back from
fully supporting the liberal arts agenda. In Chapter 1, Colander and
McGoldrick (p. 6) observe that the generalist approach that excites students by asking "big think" questions across disciplinary boundaries fails
to generate new knowledge, while the narrow "little think" questions that
can be answered often fail to develop the critical thinking skills necessary
for liberal education. As one example, the authors cite the decline of moral
reasoning in economics, which was once center stage in Adam Smith's
analysis of society. Since the rise of positivism in the late nineteenth
century, moral reasoning has become an intellectual casualty.
Virtually all major public policy problems cross disciplinary boundaries however, and raise substantial normative questions. If a key goal of
the liberal arts is to prepare students to make reasoned judgments about
complex issues, economics educators cannot sit on the sidelines and expect
that this will happen magically. Teachers play an important role in defining
the questions and discerning the methods for arriving at answers. A liberal
arts focus in economics would ensure that students grapple with ethical
dilemmas informed by a variety of approaches and competing ethical
frameworks. Moral discourse is an important way for students to scrutinize
their own unstated beliefs and to develop a deeper appreciation for the
benefits (and the limitations) of economic theory. Without it, we may be
training technocrats skilled in techniques but not prepared to be business or
community leaders- who will certainly have to navigate moral minefields.
The contribution of this discussion is to point out that a liberal education requires critical thinking skills that are only partially addressed
by traditional methods in economics. What it means to "think like an
economist" contains a hefty dose of implicit ethical judgment- which in a
liberal arts setting should be examined and debated as a way of integrating
economics with its sister disciplines in philosophy, political science, and
other fields. This comment deals with two areas of potential controversywelfare analysis and alternative moral frameworks.'
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WELFARE ANALYSIS IS NOT PURE SCIENCE
If economics is a science, why should economists and their students
know or care about ethics? The answer has three parts: first, students are
implicitly using ethical frameworks and theories in carrying out positive
research whether they are conscious of it or not. To progress, science
requires shared moral norms and positive economics entails acceptance
of these ethical ideals. Second, having students pursue the "little think"
questions in research often involves an uncritical acceptance of the ethical
assumptions and worldview upon which the research is built (Colander
and McGoldrick, Chapter 1, this volume, p. 6; Kuhn, 1962). Third, many
students (and faculty) are unaware that efficiency and Pareto optimality
are ethical constructs. Critical thinking about cost/benefit requires going
outside this comfort zone. This last point is the most troubling, because if
"efficiency" is viewed simply as a "fact" instead of an evaluative concept,
this creates intellectual blinders for students attempting to cross disciplinary boundaries (as we hope they would do in a liberal arts setting). I note
below, for example, that economics students and public health students
will likely have opposing views of what is meant by efficiency - which
is understandable only if the concept is properly understood as part of
normative discourse.
Economic efficiency is often portrayed as a positive concept however,
because "welfare" can be defined and quantitatively measured through
consumer and producer triangles. Few principles textbooks adequately
address the point that welfare economics was developed as a branch
of normative economics and that its offspring of economic efficiency is
equally an ethical proposition: it is constructed on the basis of choosing
a worthy normative goal. As the history of thought fades from graduate
school requirements, fewer teachers understand the evolution of welfare
theory and the issues that arise for public policy analysis.
Here is a quick thought experiment to bring out the normative character
of economic efficiency. Assign students the role of doctors engaged in an
emergency medical triage (the ranking of patients for treatment based on
medical severity and/or survivability). Tell the student-doctors that each
patient needs an antibiotic to survive and that there are more patients than
doses of antibiotic available. In this short-run emergency, the supply of
antibiotic is perfectly inelastic. Some gravely ill patients will likely die even
if given the antibiotic. Ask the student-doctors: "How would you decide to
allocate the scarce antibiotic?" (Answer: doctors would probably want to
allocate serum so as to be efficient at "saving the most lives," which means
giving doses of antibiotic to those whose survivability is most enhanced.)
Next ask the student-doctors, "What would you do if many of the patients
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most likely to die without antibiotics were children?" (Answer: many
doctors would now change their allocation so as to be efficient at "saving
the most life-years-extended," which means factoring in not only expected
survival but expected years lived after survival.) Finally, ask the studentdoctors to consider what would happen if antibiotics were allocated not by
triage, but rather sold to the highest bidder so as to satisfy individual consumer preferences in the market. (Answer: economic efficiency is achieved,
but probably fewer lives would be saved since triage was ignored.)
This exercise makes clear to students that there are a multitude of
notions of "efficiency," and each serves a different normative master.
Economists use a particular ethical norm as their implicit "baggage" - the
definition and choice of dominant goal ("economic welfare") - by which
the economic system is evaluated. The economic view is most certainly
defensible, but not on positive grounds; it relies upon a series of restrictive normative arguments. This economic baggage should be subject to
scrutiny and discussion in the classroom. You would not let someone on a
plane without checking the contents of their carry-on, and economics education should be no different. We should unpack and examine the ethical
framework that informs the standard economic approach. For a complete
discussion of these issues, see Hausman and McPherson (2006).
Textbooks set the context for much classroom discussion, and most
textbook authors have followed the trend of preparing students for
narrow specialization rather than liberal learning. In the most recent
edition of Frank and Bernanke (2009), the authors illustrate some of the
problems relating to the discussion of efficiency. First, the authors carefully note that "efficiency is not the only goal" of an economic system and
that an efficient outcome is not the same thing as a "good" outcome. But
they go on to state - as if it were a scientific fact rather than a normative
argument - that, "efficiency should be the first goal." The authors base
this claim on the assertion that being economically efficient "enables us
to achieve all our other goals to the fullest possible extent" (p. 179). This
implies that static efficiency in the short run is in fact the only "good"
outcome because there is an alchemic process that can best turn it into any
other desirable outcome. As we demonstrated in the triage case, however,
this is not always possible. Achieving economic efficiency often comes at
the expense of other measures of efficiency, such as saving the most lives
or life-years extended.
Even if the economic welfare approach (satisfying consumer preferences) does not save the most lives in the short run, students should
discern that allowing patients to bid up the price of antibiotics could lead
to more serum (and better serum) being produced in the long run. Hence,
more lives might be saved over time by allowing competitive markets to
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work. This is an insightful point, and students should consider the structure of it: the economic goal has suddenly shifted from static efficiency to
dynamic efficiency. Our attention turns away from satisfying consumer
preferences in this market, and towards satisfying preferences in some
undefined future time period. Do future consumers have moral standing
(for example, should their preferences count)? What is the correct time
horizon for making this analysis? And how should we discount future lives
gained versus the present lives lost? One distinction between classical and
Austrian economists on the one hand, and modern neo-classical economists on the other, is the differing attention provided to dynamic versus
static efficiency (Blaug, 2001). These are thorny ethical issues in addition
to scientific questions, and students will confront similar problems in a
variety of policy areas and classes.
In summary, economics teachers can make a strong case for appraising policies on the basis of static efficiency, but this requires an evaluative framework that is substantially different from classical economics
and from other consequentialist approaches (such as classical utilitarian
or rule-utilitarian approaches). Non-consequentialist modes of analysis
might also be helpful in some cases (Frank, 2000). We turn briefly to this
topic.

ALTERNATIVE ETHICAL FRAMEWORKS
The analysis of public policy goes deeper than simply choosing normative goals within a consequentialist framework. The reason for this is that
sometimes process matters, and "the ends do not justify the means" as
exemplified in Kantian and religious ethics. My experience is that many
students adopt duty-, rights-, and religious-based arguments either consciously or unconsciously. Students encounter Kantian ethics in a variety
of non-economics classes, and they are taught the categorical imperative
that no person should be used as a means to another's end. Students
thus justify the Living Wage movement based on a belief in the inherent
dignity and equality of every person, rather than an analysis of outcomes
produced by such a policy. Religious rules and duties (such as the Ten
Commandments) also shape the social landscape and their "rightness"
is said to derive from divine law. Some students support market interventions like price controls because of intrinsic religious or other norms
against price gouging and usury.
In addition to rules and duties, virtue ethics is an increasingly popular
moral theory that students will encounter in philosophy and business
ethics classes. Virtue ethics deals with understanding and shaping the
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intentions and preferences of the economic agent. Students are thoroughly
familiar with this approach because proper socialization usually entailed
parents and other mentors highlighting virtuous conducts and enforcing
habits they would like their children to internalize. For most economists,
intentions and preferences are exogenous to our models and not within
the scope of public policy choices. Yet current policy debates may raise
notions of personal responsibility, self-control, and civic virtues (for
example, in welfare reform, in tax compliance, in voting, and ultimatum
game behaviors).
Rather than dismissing non-economic perspectives, teachers should
engage students in critical thinking exercises about non-consequentialist
ethical approaches. This creates openings for discussion between classes
in economics and political science, philosophy, religion, and other areas
where rights, duties, and virtue ethics often dominate the discourse. It is
also important that faculties in those disciplines abandon the caricature of
Homo economicus and develop a deeper appreciation for consequentialist
thinking in economics and the ethical justification for markets that derive
from it. To promote these ends, I briefly outline in class and in a handout
the three main ethical approaches (consequences, duties/rules, and virtues).
I tell students that economics can contribute important insights to the analysis of consequences, but that some public policy situations may require
them to analyze and judge alternative ethical frameworks supported with
relevant arguments. While economists are not experts in moral theory,
that in itself is an insufficient reason for ignoring the topic. Critical thinking would require grappling with alternative ethical frameworks because
they are ubiquitously intertwined with public policy choices and with the
lives our students lead outside of economics classes.

CONCLUSION
Preparing students for complex decision-making may require reintegrating a basic understanding of how economists construct measures of
welfare, how moral agents actually behave in markets, and how science
relies upon virtuous norms and normative arguments. The Teagle report
rightly laments the neglect of moral reasoning in economics because its
absence in the classroom limits critical thinking and ultimately debases the
liberal arts experience. If economic concepts were successfully integrated
into a liberal arts setting, students "would not think that the economic way
of thinking is the only right way of thinking" and they would be knowledgeable about alternative ways of thinking (Colander and McGoldrick,
Chapter 1, this volume, p. 19). A liberal arts education would reveal the
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economic way of thinking in its historical and ethical context, providing
linkages to other disciplines. It is always challenging for teachers to take
on something new, and moral discourse may be a particularly troubling
add-on for economists. My own experience is that the marginal costs of
introducing ethics are quite low when normative discourse is addressed
in small doses over many days (examples can be found in Wight and
Morton, 2007). Like most teaching, repetition is needed for students to
develop competency. The marginal benefits of addressing moral inquiry
are quite large, however, because the study of economics adds more to the
students' liberal arts experience when its practice is synergistic with, and
complementary to, other soCial sciences and humanities.

NOTE
* Erik Craft, KimMarie McGoldrick, Robert Frank, and Justin Weiss provided valuable
comments; conclusions remain the author's. This discussion draws on a forthcoming
essay (Wight, 2009).

